Unmarried fertility, crime, and cocial stigma by Kendall, Todd & Tamura, Robert
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Unmarried fertility, crime, and cocial
stigma
Todd Kendall and Robert Tamura
Clemson University
1. April 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8031/
MPRA Paper No. 8031, posted 1. April 2008 16:28 UTC
  
Unmarried Fertility, Crime, and Social Stigma∗ 
 
 
Todd D. Kendall 
Robert Tamura 
 
 
March, 2008 
 
 
 
Abstract. Children born to unmarried parents may receive lower 
human capital investments in youth, leading to higher levels of criminal 
activity as adults.  Therefore, unmarried fertility may be positively 
associated with future crime.  On the other hand, in an environment in 
which social stigma attached to non-marital fertility is high, many low 
match quality parents will choose (or be forced) to marry, and children 
reared in these families may actually be worse off than had their parents 
not married.  We explore these effects empirically, finding that over the 
long run, unmarried fertility is positively associated with murder and 
property crime, but that the degree of social stigma has affected this 
relationship.  For instance, our results suggest that some marriages in 
the 1940s and 1950s were of such low quality that the children involved 
would have been better off in single-parent households; however, this 
finding is reversed for marriages in the 1960s and thereafter – many 
marriages that would have benefited children have since been foregone.  
We also discuss implications for the debate over the “abortion-crime” 
link of Donohue and Levitt (2001). 
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I. Introduction 
Some of the most salient questions in the social sciences deal with the social effects of 
family structure.  In this paper, we focus on one such question which has received little attention, 
the long-run relationship between unmarried fertility and crime.  Using state-level data from the 
United States over the period 1923-2002, we find that a steady-state increase of 10 non-marital 
births per 1,000 live births is associated with increases of between 2.5% and 5% in murder and 
property crime rates.  This effect is important since Levitt (2004) finds that over the 1973-1991 
period, predicted murder rates should have fallen by 20%, when in fact they rose by 5%.  Our 
analysis shows that the rise in unmarried fertility predicts a ceteris paribus increase of between 
14% and 28% in murder over this period, thus explaining most of the otherwise unexplained 
crime trend. 
Using our long time series, we also find the correlation between out-of-wedlock 
childbirth and future crime seems to have grown larger over time, to be stronger among 
nonwhites than among whites, and to be more important in areas where social norms are weaker.  
We argue that these effects may be due to variation in the parental match quality of the marginal 
out-of-wedlock childbirth.  In particular, when unmarried parents face high levels of social 
stigma against non-marital childrearing, only the lowest quality parental matches fail to marry – 
ones in which children may not have been much better off, or possibly even worse off, had the 
parents married.  On the other hand, when non-marital fertility is more culturally acceptable, 
some marriages that would have benefited children will then be foregone, implying a positive 
relationship between unmarried fertility and future crime.1 
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 Similarly, but with respect to divorce, Becker (1981) writes, “[t]he expected gain from remaining married was 
generally quite large in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries….Consequently, persons divorcing then must 
have been very badly matched or temperamentally very unsuited to marriage….The average divorced person is now 
considered temperamentally more normal than in the past.” 
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In general, stigma and similar social norms may serve as a substitute for legal restrictions 
on non-marital childbirth (see the discussion in Posner, 2000, chapter 5).  Stigma-based 
restriction is more flexible, potentially punishing those who impose greater costs on society to a 
greater extent; however, legal restrictions may avoid unfavorable forms of discrimination in the 
application of stigma.  In general, our findings illustrate how the level of social stigma in a 
society can change the outcomes of formal laws and policies regarding marriage and childbirth. 
An additional contribution of the paper is to help clarify the relationship between 
abortion and future crime rates, as hypothesized by Donohue and Levitt (2001) – hereafter, “DL” 
– who argue that legalization of abortion in the 1970s improved family planning and timing 
decisions, and reduced unwanted childbirths, thus reducing future crime rates as the impacted 
cohorts moved into adulthood in the 1990s.  However, while the number of abortions may 
respond to declines in the cost of abortion (such as after legalization), much variation in abortion 
rates may simply be due to greater levels of preventative sexual behavior.  If so, then low 
abortion rates would actually be associated with lower future crime rates, since they signify a 
low number of unwanted childbirths.  By analyzing directly a measure of unwanted childbirth, 
we can therefore provide a clearer test of the hypothesis.  We focus on unmarried childbirth; 
88% of pregnancies to unmarried women were cited as “unwanted” by their mothers, in the sense 
of being undesired or mistimed as late as 1987, one of the last birth cohort years to be relevant 
for our analysis (Ventura and Bachrach, 2000).2  Since we find that unmarried fertility is strongly 
related to future crime, our results support the DL hypothesis. 
While a number of previous studies have found that unmarried fertility is associated with 
unfavorable childhood outcomes, our analysis is one of the first to measure the long-run effect on 
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 Data is unavailable for earlier periods, but for 1994, the percentage of unwanted pregnancies to unmarried women 
is 78%.  Thus, it seems unlikely that unwantedness was substantially lower than 88% before 1987.  For married 
women, the equivalent number in 1987 is 40%. 
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crime when these children reach adulthood.  For instance, Comanor and Phillips (1999) and 
McLanahan and Harper (1999) show heightened rates of juvenile delinquency among children 
born to unmarried mothers, using longitudinal data from cohorts born in the 1970s.  Also similar 
to our research are Hunt (2003) and Sen (2003), who focus on teen birth rates (most teens are 
unmarried) and find positive correlations between having a teen mother and adult criminal 
propensities, and Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), who examine the relationship between divorce 
and crime.  While the individual-level data used in many of these studies is highly important for 
some purposes, our state-level analysis allows us to analyze the relationship between unmarried 
fertility and the overall crime rate, to examine this relationship over a longer time period, and to 
control fully for the effects of abortion.  We are also able to examine how and why these effects 
change over time, and to analyze how social stigma against unmarried fertility interacts with the 
effect of unmarried fertility on future crime; nevertheless, our findings are broadly consistent 
with this literature.3 
 
II. Theory 
1. Unmarried Fertility 
The “unmarried fertility ratio”4 for state i in year t is defined as:  

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As Figure 1 shows, the national UFR rose slowly until the early 1960s, then increased 
rapidly after.  The cause-in-fact of any change in the UFR must be either: (a) a change in the 
                                                 
3
 See, however, footnote 39 below for more detail. 
4
 An alternative measure of unmarried fertility is the birth rate for unmarried women, ages 15-44.  However, this 
latter measure is not generally available for subnational regions over long time series, and, moreover, UFR is 
thought to be more relevant for the social consequences of unmarried fertility (Cutright and Smith, 1988). 
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population share of unmarried women; or (b) a change in the fertility of unmarried women 
relative to married women.  There seems to be some evidence for both, as may be expected given 
the large increases visible in Figure 1.5  Proximate causes for increases in the unmarried fertility 
ratio are many and controversial, including important government policies such as welfare 
payments for unmarried mothers and child support laws.6  Our findings show that the social 
value of policies that affect marriage and childbirth incentives may depend on the level of social 
stigma prevalent in society. 
Children born to unmarried mothers generally receive lower human capital investments 
because the contractual partnership between the parents is less stable, and sometimes non-
existent (Becker, 1981).  A child born to an unmarried mother may spend her childhood in a 
variety of different circumstances.  Among other possibilities, she may be raised by: a single 
parent alone; both parents, who married shortly after the birth; both parents, who cohabitate 
without marrying; one parent, married or cohabitating with a step-parent; one parent and a 
grandparent, or any combination of these at different times during youth.  Most research suggests 
that all of these arrangements generally involve a decline in childhood outcomes relative to a 
household with two parents married before birth.7  Our research asks whether these effects 
continue to have an impact into adulthood, focusing on criminal behavior in particular. 
                                                 
5
 Gray, et al, (2004) show that the population share of unmarried women has increased significantly, while Smith, et 
al (1996) find an increase in unmarried fertility, and Ventura and Bachrach (2000) cite declines in birth rates for 
marrieds and increases in intercourse frequency among unmarrieds. 
6
 There is a substantial literature.  Some proximate causes that have been suggested include: lower returns from 
specialization in marriage (Becker, 1981); the legalization of abortion (as discussed in the following subsection) 
(Akerlof, et al, 1996); changes in racial composition (Korenman et al, 2004); changes in social norms regarding 
premarital sex (Nechyba, 2001); generosity of welfare programs towards unmarried women (Ellwood and Bane, 
1994); loosening of child support rules (Aizer and McLanahan, 2005); increases in male unemployment and 
imprisonment rates (Wilson, 1987); and declines in religiosity (Berggren, 1997). 
7
 Hofferth (2003) and McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) find that children living with a step-parent suffer lower 
academic and mental health outcomes relative to those with married biological parents, and Gordon (1999) provides 
evidence that they are at higher risk for sexual abuse.  Cohabitating parents are less educated (Carlson, et al, 2004), 
more likely to have drug and alcohol abuse problems, suffer mental depression, and serve time in correctional 
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A number of scholars have noted that outcomes apparently attributable to incomplete 
family structure may also be caused by other economic and social factors, such as poverty, which 
themselves may affect family structure.8  Given the limitations inherent in our data, we cannot 
fully rule out the possibility that other factors driving unmarried fertility may in fact be the root 
cause of future crime, although given the dramatic rise in the UFR visible in Figure 1, it seems 
unlikely that poverty alone is driving much of this change.9  Nevertheless, the appropriate policy 
recommendation from our results – whether to target unmarried fertility directly or the root 
factors that cause it – is a larger question than we are able to address in this paper. 
Based on the above discussion, consider a model in which individuals live two periods.  
In the first period, pregnancy happens to a unit measure of parents, and these parents then decide 
whether to marry.  In the second period, children born in the first period are adults.  Since we are 
interested in the relationship between out-of-wedlock childbirth and future crime, we ignore 
parents who are married before pregnancy.  Moreover, we also assume that each parental match 
has only one child, though this assumption is not generally restrictive (see footnote 11). 
We write a parent’s utility function as:  
),( CZUU =  
where Z is marital output and C refers to children’s life prospects.  For the purposes of our 
analysis, let C = 1 – p, where p is the probability that a child becomes a criminal as an adult; 
thus, we assume U is strictly increasing in both arguments. 
                                                                                                                                                             
institutions compared to married parents (Rector and Johnson, 2004).  Cohabitations are also highly unstable, as less 
than 20% of them survive their third anniversary intact, as compared to 80% of marriages (Brien, et al, 1999). 
8
 Some recent literature has attempted to address these issues directly.  Using longitudinal data on families, 
McLanahan and Harper (1999) show heightened rates of juvenile delinquency among children born to unmarried 
mothers, and Lillard et al (1995) find no evidence that cohabitation improves the future stability of child-rearing 
partners relative to marriage, even accounting for the self-selection of divorce-prone persons into cohabitations.  By 
contrast, Korenman, et al (2001) find little evidence of adverse effects from non-marital fertility, with the exception 
that unmarried mothers are less likely to breastfeed. 
9
 Moreover the state-level correlation between the poverty rate and UFR is only 0.20.  In a regression with fixed 
state and year effects, the estimated effect of poverty on UFR is not statistically significant, even at the 10% level. 
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Let a parent’s marital output be increasing in their marriage quality, if they have one. 
Specifically, denote output Z as: 


	
−
=
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where g is an increasing function, m ∈[0,1] denotes parental match quality, q denotes utility 
from being single, and s denotes utility loss from social stigma associated with single 
parenthood. 
 Given the discussion and literature review above, let the probability p that a child becomes 
a criminal as an adult be given by  


	
=
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with f as a decreasing function, implying that higher match quality allows for greater human 
capital investments in children.  Given c > 0, having married parents reduces the probability of 
becoming a criminal for all children born to parents of match quality )(* 1 cfmm −=> .  Thus, 
children born to parents of very low match quality may be worse off if their parents marry, since 
low match quality parents may fight often, be substance-abusers, or otherwise be unreliable in 
rearing children. 
 Therefore, parents of match quality m will marry if and only if 
[1]  )1,())(1),(( csqUmfmgU −−≥−  
Denote the match quality m for which equation [1] binds as m .  Then all matches m ≥  
m  will marry in the first period. 
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First consider the simplest case, in which match quality is uniformly distributed among 
parents.  In this case, the number of non-marital births is simply m .10  Then given the definition 
of the probability of criminality, p, crime in period 2 can be written as  
Crime = 
+
1
)(
m
dmmfmc .   
Figure 2 illustrates the implied relationship between period 2 crime and period 1 unmarried 
fertility.  Note that crime is decreasing in the number of unmarried births for m  < m*.  This is so 
because these children’s parents are of such low match quality that they are actually less likely to 
become criminals if their parents do not marry.  In general, the effect of unmarried fertility on 
crime is convex. 
Now suppose that the social stigma attached to unmarried parenthood, s, varies between 
locations over some reasonably small interval, ],[ ss .  From equation [1], it can be seen that m  
will differ across locations, depending on the value of s.  Therefore, denote the number of out-of-
wedlock childbirths in a location with social stigma s as )(sm .  Comparative statics then implies 
that locations with greater social stigma will have fewer out-of-wedlock children, since 
0<




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Then if social stigma in all locations is quite high, such that *)( msm < , cross-sectional 
comparisons will show that states with more unmarried fertility in period 1 have lower crime 
rates in period 2.  On the other hand, if social stigma is quite low across most states – say if 
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 Note that m  is not the UFR; all of the parents in our model conceive before deciding whether to marry, but 
obviously many other parents are already married at the time of conception.  Nevertheless, under weak assumptions, 
UFR would be monotonic in m . 
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*)( msm >  – then cross-sectional comparisons will show that states with more unmarried 
fertility in period 1 have higher crime rates in period 2.  In general, as social stigma falls 
globally, the cross-sectional relationship between unmarried fertility and crime will grow more 
positive.  It can also be shown that this pattern is evident even if the assumptions of one child per 
couple and uniformly distributed match quality are relaxed.11 
For instance, if social opprobrium towards unwed mothers has waned over time, we 
should then observe a more positive relationship between out-of-wedlock childbirth and future 
crime when analyzing later birth cohorts relative to earlier ones; and if social stigma towards 
non-marital fertility is higher among whites than non-whites, the relationship between unmarried 
fertility and future crime should be more positive among non-whites; and if sexual mores are 
looser in particular regions of the country, again, the relationship between unmarried fertility and 
future crime should be larger in those areas.  We will see in the following section that all of these 
statements appear to be empirically supportable. 
 
2. Abortion 
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 A simple, though indirect way to allow for both of these effects in the model is by relaxing the assumption of a 
uniform distribution of match quality.  That is, we still model each family as having one child, but now allow for 
more families of certain match quality than others – and so indirectly affect the distribution of children across match 
types.  Therefore, let the probability distribution of match quality be given by )(mϑ , with support [0,1].  Then 
crime in period 2 can be written as 


 +
1
0
)()()(
m
m
dmmmfdmmc ϑϑ  while the number of non-marital births is now 

m
dmm
0
)(ϑ .  
Note that the relationship between period 2 crime and the cut-off level of match quality for marriage, m , is U-
shaped as before, since [ ])()()( mfcm
md
Crimed
−= ϑ .  As in Figure 2, crime is decreasing for m  < m* )(1 cf −= , and 
increasing in m  thereafter.  Therefore, crime is also U-shaped in the number of non-marital births, with crime 
decreasing (increasing) in unmarried fertility for levels of unmarried fertility less (greater) than 


− )(
0
1
)(
cf
dmmϑ .  This 
minimum point is reached at a higher (lower) level of unmarried fertility when )(mϑ  places more mass on low 
(high) levels of match quality.  Therefore, the level of social stigma needed to induce a negative relationship 
between unmarried fertility and crime will be lower when there are relatively more children from low match quality 
parents. 
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According to Donohue and Levitt (2001), abortion may decrease future crime if it 
reduces the number of children reared in unfavorable family circumstances.  Parents may use 
abortion as a form of birth control, eliminating unwanted pregnancies and favorably changing the 
timing of wanted pregnancies.  The children from unwanted pregnancies, had they been born, 
would have likely grown up in circumstances which may be breeding grounds for future 
criminality.  For instance, Gruber, et al (1999) find that children on the margin of abortion face 
higher poverty and worse health than the median, Angrist and Evans (1999) find that abortion 
liberalization reduced teen childbirth, and Levine, et al (1999) show that those seeking abortions 
are more likely to be poor and teenaged.12 
However, there are two important biases in identifying such an effect empirically, one 
measurement-based and one structural.  The measurement issue relates to the fact that it is 
actually “wantedness”, not abortion, that influences future crime.  Or as Levitt and Dubner 
(2005) write in their popularization of the DL hypothesis, “Legalized abortion led to less 
unwantedness; unwantedness leads to high crime; legalized abortion, therefore, led to less 
crime.”  If parents use abortion as a way of reducing unwantedness, then abortion will reduce 
crime; however, abortion is also a substitute for other forms of birth control, such as 
prophylactics and abstention.  Therefore, some variation in the number of abortions may simply 
signify variation in the use of substitute birth control methods, in which case lower levels of 
abortion will actually correlate with less unwantedness, and therefore, less crime.  In other 
words, it is difficult to distinguish shifts in the demand curve for abortions from movements 
along the demand curve.  Therefore, to find the true effect of a policy change that liberalizes 
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 See Sailer (1999), Lott and Whitley (2001), and Joyce (2003, 2004) for some evidence that disputes the DL 
hypothesis, and see Leigh and Wolfers (2000), Sen (2003), Pop-Eleches (2006), and Ananat, et al (2006) for 
evidence that corroborates DL.  Kahane, et al (2005) find ambiguous results. 
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abortion, looking directly at a measure of unwantedness, such as the unmarried fertility ratio, 
may be more appropriate. 
Analyzing abortion in concert with unmarried fertility also addresses an important 
structural issue, first raised by Akerlof, et al (1996).  They consider a model with two groups of 
unmarried women: those who are morally opposed to abortion, and those who are not.  When 
abortion availability increases, the cost of sexual activity for women not opposed to abortion 
falls, and so they increase their frequency of intercourse.  However, this also lowers the marriage 
market prospects of those women opposed to abortion, so they must increase their sexual activity 
as well.13  This latter effect means that abortion availability may actually increase the rate of 
unmarried fertility.  As evidence for this effect, Ventura and Bachrach (2000) report national 
survey evidence that at least 88% of out-of-wedlock pregnancies were unwanted in 1987,14 long 
after the legalization of abortion.  If, as suggested above, unwantedness is positively associated 
with future crime, abortion may then cause increases in future crime.15 
We expect to find empirically that, after controlling for contemporaneous unmarried 
fertility, the effect of abortion to reduce crime should be stronger.  This is because the effect of 
abortion on crime, conditional on contemporaneous unmarried fertility, is estimated through 
variation in unwanted or mistimed pregnancies in married households, untempered by abortion’s 
potential for causing increases in unwantedness. 
 
III. Data and Empirical Methods 
                                                 
13
 Chiappori and Oreffice (2005) allow potential partners to bargain over household surpluses, and so endogenize the 
payoffs to each partner from marriage.  They show that the Akerlof, et al (1996) results are not robust to some 
specifications of underlying parameter values. 
14
 The equivalent number for 1994 is 78%. 
15
 Lott and Whitley (2001) also discuss the Akerlof, et al (1996) results in their impact on crime, though they do not 
explicitly test any hypothesis related thereto. 
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Following the theory presented above, we seek to estimate the effects of unmarried 
fertility and abortion on crime.  We have already defined the unmarried fertility ratio in the 
previous section.  The “abortion ratio” for state i in year t is defined as: 
  
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RatioAbortion 000,1  
Following the method of Donohue and Levitt (2001), we estimate the fraction of the 
criminal population “missing” due to abortion in state i in year t as a weighted sum of previous 
years’ abortion ratios, with the weights given by the age distribution of arrests for crime c in year 
t.  In other words, we calculate the “effective” abortion rate for state i in year t as: 
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where arrestsact is the number of arrests of individuals of age a for crime c in year t.16 
 Our calculations of the effective abortion rate differ from those of Donohue and Levitt 
(2001) in three ways.  First, we use as weights the age distribution of arrests in each 
contemporaneous year, as opposed to using one year’s age distribution to proxy the age 
distribution of criminals in all years.17  Second, in some cases, FBI data provide only the number 
of arrests for 5-year age groups, not each age separately.  DL assume that this arrest rate is 
constant across all ages in the 5-year group; in contrast, we assume that the arrest rate for a 5-
year age group is an accurate measure of the arrest rate for the median age in that group.  Then, 
we calculate the arrest rates for other ages in the group by linear extrapolation between age 
groups.  Thus, our arrest distribution does not have any discreet steps between ages.  Thirdly, we 
                                                 
16
 By assumption, but also because FBI data do not separate out ages of very young criminals, there are no arrests of 
individuals under age 8. 
17
 Donohue and Levitt (2001) use the 1985 arrest distribution.  In personal correspondence, the authors suggested 
that they wished to abstract away from abortion’s affect on the age distribution of arrests; however, this may be 
inappropriate over long periods of time, and so may affect the measurement of the full effect of abortion, even over 
small periods. 
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use a different set of data on abortion ratios.  There are two sources of state-level data on 
abortion: surveys of abortion providers from the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), and state 
health department reports collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).  DL use the 
former source, while Joyce (2003) argues that the CDC data is more reliable, since it includes 
estimates as early as 1970, while AGI data begin with national legalization in 1973.  The 
drawback of CDC data is that some states do not mandate reporting of abortion data, so missing 
data is problematic.  However, due to limitations in the data on unmarried fertility, as described 
below, the missing CDC abortion data will not limit our analysis;18 moreover, our results do not 
change when we substitute AGI data, supplemented with CDC data from 1970-1972. 
 We similarly calculate an “effective” unmarried fertility ratio as: 
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 One problem with this calculation is that state-level data on out-of-wedlock childbirth is 
first reported in 1923, and then only for a limited number of states (see discussion below).  Thus, 
the ideal of calculating a weighted sum of UFR observations lagged 8 to lifetime years is 
infeasible, and there is a tradeoff between the number of lagged years included in the calculation 
and the number of years of crime data that can be explained.  Since the age distribution of arrests 
is generally heavily weighted towards young people, estimating the effective UFR by excluding 
relatively older cohorts will not affect the calculation much, and so for the work below, we 
include lagged UFR statistics from 8 to 34 years.19  Consistent with this hypothesis, our results 
are robust to experimentation with shorter and longer lags.  
                                                 
18
 Another drawback of both data sources is that no reliable data on illegal abortions before legalization is available.  
Following previous literature, we assume a zero abortion ratio before legalization in all states, though see Joyce 
(2003) for a critique of this assumption. 
19
 These ages constitute more than 80% of arrests in most years for most crimes.  In our calculations of the age 
distribution of arrests, the denominator is total arrests for all ages, not arrests 8-34; therefore, the age distribution 
 14
 Unmarried fertility ratios are calculated based on data from birth certificates.  A serious 
measurement problem is that many states historically have not required a statement of marital 
status on the birth certificate, and the number of states that do require such information varies 
slightly over time.20  Since 1980, computer technology has allowed for inference of marital status 
based on paternity acknowledgements or by matching surnames of father and child; however, 
before 1980, data is simply missing for a significant number of states.  With minimal 
interpolation between years in a small number of cases, reliable time series data is available for 
32 states over most of the years between 1923 and 2002.21  Figure 3 presents a map of these 
states, which are geographically diverse, although several well-populated states, including 
California, New York, and Massachusetts are unfortunately missing.22 
 Acknowledging the limitations discussed above, panel data for between 20 and 32 states is 
available to explain variations in crime rates between 1957 and 2002 (see the Data Appendix for 
details).23  For each crime, estimates of the following equation can be made: 
 
[2] ittiitititit XRatioAbortionEffUFREffratecrime εδαββ +++Γ++= ).().()ln( 21  
                                                                                                                                                             
will not sum to one.  This helps to avoid bias due to changes in the fraction of crimes committed by 35+ year olds.  
Nevertheless, we have also estimated our results using an age distribution conditional on ages 8-34, and find no 
relevant differences.  
20
 Another source of unreliability in the data is the systematic underreporting of out-of-wedlock childbirth in Texas 
and Michigan over the 1990-1993 period due to legislation passed in those states.  We make no attempt to correct 
for this problem because children born during this period are, at most, 13 years old in 2002, the last year for which 
crime data is used in estimation, and the fraction of arrests accruing to individuals under age 13 for most crimes is 
small. 
21
 While the number of interpolated observations is small, the analysis of Murphy and Topel (1985) suggests 
interpolation may bias estimated standard errors.  Our results are robust to exclusion of all interpolated data. 
22
 Alternatively, states may be grouped into census regions and race-specific unmarried fertility ratios for other 
states within the same region may be applied to states with missing data.  This procedure has been generally used to 
estimate national trends in unmarried fertility, though less so in recent years as the break in trend between 1979 data 
calculated in this way and 1980 data calculated using the computerized inferral methods described in the text seem 
to imply significant flaws in the grouping procedure. 
23
 The differences in the number of states available in each year is due to the fact that not all states required 
registration of births as early as 1923.  Effective UFRs may be calculated for 20 states in 1957, but for 29 states by 
1961, and 32 states after 1966.  Selection based on the introduction of data from more states does not, however, 
drive the results below (see also footnote 49 below). 
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where iα and tδ  represent state and year fixed effects, respectively, and X is a vector of state-
level covariates including law enforcement measures, such as prisoners and police per capita, 
death penalty executions (Dezhbakhsh, et al, 2003, but see also Donohue and Wolfers, 2005) 
concealed handgun laws (Lott and Mustard, 1997, but see also Duggan, 2001); economic 
measures, such as the unemployment rate and output per worker; age demographics;24 years of 
schooling in the labor force and school enrollment measurements, church membership rates, 
urbanization and gender ratios, a measure of racial heterogeneity25, and proxies for consumption 
of alcohol and crack cocaine (Fryer, et al, 2005).  The data appendix gives details on the 
collection of each of these variables, and Table 1 provides some summary statistics for reference. 
 
IV. Results 
  1. Unmarried Fertility and Crime, 1957-2002 
In any particular year, the effective UFR is generally strongly correlated with crime rates.  
Figure 4 illustrates a scatter plot of effective UFR and the murder rate per 1,000 residents (in 
natural log) for the 25 states for which data is available in 1960 and the 32 for which data is 
available in 2000.  Note that, in 2000 (with the exception of District of Columbia), the effective 
UFRs are in the range of 50-200, representing 50-200 out-of-wedlock births for every 1,000 live 
births.  Since most murders are committed by individuals aged 18-25, a state’s effective UFR in 
                                                 
24
 We include separate variables for the percentage of a state’s population in each five year age group from 0-4 
through 70-74. 
25
 Calculated as a “Herfindahl”-style index, racial heterogeneity = 1-[(%black)2+(%non-black)2].  Thus, larger 
values are associated with greater heterogeneity, with a maximum value of 0.5 (perfect heterogeneity), and a 
minimum value of 0 (perfect homogeneity). 
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a given year should be of a similar magnitude as its actual UFR roughly 20 years earlier (the 
national UFR in 1980 was 159).26 
Figure 4 illustrates a positive relationship between murder rates and the effective UFR in 
both years (similar relationships hold for other crimes as well).  Of course, this analysis is purely 
cross-sectional, and does not account for any omitted variables that could create a spurious 
correlation; nevertheless, we will see that with a more sophisticated analysis this relationship 
generally holds in later years.  However, we find that the relationship disappears for early years, 
consistent with our theory regarding the fall in stigma. 
Table 2 presents estimates of the coefficients in equation [2] for murder.  All available 
data from 1957-2002 is employed to estimate the equation, and year- and state-fixed effects are 
included in all regressions, in order to control for national secular trends in crime and invariant 
state-level characteristics.27  The t-statistics, presented in parentheses below each coefficient, are 
derived from a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach that adjusts for heteroskedasticity, temporal 
correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation.  The first column 
presents an estimate of the effect of unmarried fertility on future crime, not controlling for any 
covariates.28  The magnitude of this coefficient implies that a steady-state increase in the 
effective UFR of 10 per 1,000 live births is associated with a long run 1.4% increase in murder 
rates.  The second column in Table 2 includes all covariates except for the effective abortion rate.  
Including these covariates helps to control for omitted variables; however, to the extent that 
unmarried fertility has indirect effects on crime by changing the level of the covariates, their 
                                                 
26
 Larger states tend to have higher UFRs, making the national rate higher than the simple median state’s rate. 
27
 Data from 32 states over this period, constituting 1,472 observations are available.  Of these, the fact that not all 
states began registering births as early as 1923 lowers the number of observations on effective UFR to 1,423.  
Moreover, for some states in the 1950s, state-level unemployment figures are unavailable, leaving 1,409 
observations.  For the purposes of comparison, we exclude the observations with missing unemployment figures 
from the regressions without covariates; however, their inclusion does not change the results appreciably. 
28
 State and year fixed effects are still included, however. 
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inclusion may be inappropriate.  It can be seen that inclusion of these covariates strengthens the 
measured relationship between unmarried fertility and future crime, more than doubling it in 
magnitude.29 
In column 3, we attempt to replicate Donohue and Levitt (2001)’s analysis by regressing 
the murder rate on the effective abortion ratio, while not including any measure of unmarried 
fertility.  Like DL, we find that abortion reduces future murder rates in a statistically significant 
way.  The magnitude of our result is similar to theirs as well, although recall that our calculations 
differ slightly from theirs, and we include more covariates and a longer time-series of data. 
In column 4, we estimate the effects of unmarried fertility and abortion jointly on murder, 
and column 5 extends this model to include all the other covariates.30 
Later, we will consider the robustness of these results, but here we will use these results 
to engage in counterfactual policy experiments.  Between 1973 and 1991, the effective UFR for 
murder rose from 32.09 to 88.32, a change of 56.23.  Multiplying this difference by the estimates 
in columns 4 and 5, our results imply a ceteris paribus increase in murder rates over this period 
of roughly 14% to 28%.  In a meta-analysis of crime literature, Levitt (2004) argues that the 
combined effects of demographic changes, increases in police forces and imprisonment rates, 
and the crack epidemic imply an overall fall in murder rates of 20% over this period.  In 
actuality, murder rose by 5%, leaving an unexplained increase of 25%.  Therefore, our estimates 
of the effects of unmarried fertility can explain most, or perhaps even all, of the unexplained rise 
                                                 
29
 R2 is high in these regressions, though this is not unusual given the inclusion of state and year fixed effects.  
Nevertheless, even without these fixed effects, the covariates explain roughly 96% of the variation in murder rates. 
30
 A concern with the inclusion of both abortion and UFR is that both are proxies for measures of unwantedness, 
potentially measurements with error, and it is difficult to definitively sign any biases associated with measurement 
error when the error may be correlated across regressors. 
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in crime during the 1970s and 1980s.  Our results are also broadly consistent with national crime 
trends in the 1990s.31 
For policy purposes, a comparison in the relative sizes of the coefficients on unmarried 
fertility and abortion suggests that abortion is quite a blunt policy lever for reducing crime, 
relative to policies that promote effective family formation directly.  Using the standard 
deviations listed in Table 1 for the 1985-2002 period, and the coefficients in the fifth column of 
Table 2, an increase of one standard deviation in the effective abortion ratio (102.40) is 
associated with a 17.4% decline in long-run murder rates; while a one standard deviation 
increase in the effective UFR (39.52) is associated with a 19.8% increase in long-run murder 
rates.32  In 1985, a one standard deviation increase in the abortion ratio corresponds to roughly 
385,000 abortions.  Since there were 16,137 murders in 2004, this means that for every 137 
abortions in 1985, one murder was averted in 2004.  A similar calculation for unmarried fertility 
implies that each 47 non-marital births in 1985 are associated with one additional murder in 
2004.33  To be clear, this does not mean that one in every 47 children of a broken home becomes 
a murderer, since a small number of criminals commit a large proportion of crimes.  
Nevertheless, from these comparisons, policies that would incentivize more marriage seem to 
have higher productivity than those that would incentivize more abortion.  However, this 
                                                 
31
 Levitt (2004) shows that the combined effects of police, imprisonment, and crack imply a fall in murder of 26% 
over the 1991-2001 period.  Using our estimates of the effect of abortion on murder, the rise in the effective abortion 
rate implies a fall in murder of 34%, while the rise in the effective UFR implies a rise in murder of between 12% 
and 22%.  Therefore, the overall effect of increases in police presence, imprisonment, abortion, and unmarried 
fertility, plus the effects of crack, imply a net decline in murder over this period of between 38% and 48%.  The 
actual decline in murder in the 32 states we analyze between 1991 and 2002 was 47.5%.   
32
 Using the coefficients from column 4, (-0.17 x 102.40) = 17.41 and (0.50 x 39.52) = 19.76. 
33
 There were 3,761,000 live births in 1985.  Therefore 148,634 non-marital births represents one standard deviation, 
and 19.8% of 16,137 murders in 2004 is 3,195 murders.  148,634/3195 = 46.52. 
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analysis is highly incomplete since it does not take into account the potentially different costs of 
such policies.34 
As discussed earlier, abortion may affect crime in two structural ways: it may reduce the 
number or timing of unwanted children (as in DL), leading to a long run decline in crime, and it 
may cause some women who do not wish to make use of abortion technology to have more 
unwanted children, leading to a long run increase in crime (as in Akerlof, et al, 1996).  The 
inclusion of both effective UFR and the effective abortion ratio allows us to separate these 
effects in the data, thus estimating the effects of abortion on crime through changes in the 
fertility behavior of married parents only.  Noticeably, it is evident that the inclusion of both 
variables increases the measured effect of abortion in comparison to specifications that exclude 
unmarried fertility, and also increases the measured effect of unmarried fertility in comparison 
with specifications that exclude abortion.   
Thus, as the theory suggests, holding constant unmarried fertility, abortion has a stronger 
effect on crime reduction.  Specifically, the results of columns 3 and 5 may be interpreted to 
mean that a steady-state increase of 10 abortions per 1,000 live births is associated with a long 
run decline of 1.7% in murder rates; however, this decline is dampened to only a 1% decline due 
to the fact that abortion is correlated with increases in non-marital fertility.  Column 5 also 
implies that an increase of 10 unmarried childbirths per 1,000 live births is associated with a 5% 
                                                 
34
 One very straightforward, if incomplete, way of doing so is by using a median representative of the statistical 
“value of life” of $7,000,000.  The analysis therefore implies that each abortion “saves” $51,095 worth of future 
(statistical) lives, assuming the fetus is valued at $0, while each marriage among unmarried parents saves roughly 
$152,174 worth of future lives.  The analysis of Simon and Tamura (2006) finds that the marginal child is worth 
roughly $60,000 to parents; therefore, a policy that subsidizes abortion (such as through Medicaid) would not be 
expected to pass a cost-benefit test with respect to crime, particularly if the subsidy led to moral hazard in fertility 
behavior.  On the other hand, the analysis of Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) finds that a happy marriage is worth 
roughly $100,000.  Since parents who choose not to marry must expect a relatively unhappy marriage, an upper 
bound on the cost of marrying two parents who do not wish to marry might be estimated at $100,000.  Therefore, a 
policy that subsidized marriage (or taxed out-of-wedlock births, as suggested by Ellwood, 1988) among unmarried 
parents would likely pass a cost-benefit test, given the long-run benefit of $152,174 savings in future lives, although 
all of this analysis assumes no social discounting of the future. 
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increase in murder; therefore, a “back-of-the-envelope” analysis implies that an increase of 10 
abortions per 1,000 live births is associated with an increase of roughly 1.4 non-marital births per 
1,000 live births (given the 7% difference between the estimates for abortion in columns 3 and 
5).  Therefore, while the overall effect of abortion on crime is negative, if non-marital births have 
other social effects besides those on crime, policy-makers should consider carefully both effects 
when deciding abortion policy. 
We now turn to the final two columns in Table 2, which have further suggestive 
implications for policy.  In column 6, we include several lagged measures of marriage and 
divorce behavior in an attempt to address the question of whether illegitimacy is a fundamental 
cause of future criminal behavior as presented in the model, or if it is a proxy for the effect of 
two parent households on child development.  In the latter case, marriage may have an 
ameliorative effect on children’s future prospects even if the children were initially unwanted.  
To distinguish these effects in a simple way, we collected additional data on the share of adults 
16 and older who were married in each state, from census records from 1940-2000, inclusive.  
We also collected annual new marriages and divorces by state over this time period.  We then 
constructed the new marriage rate, defined as the number of marriages in a state in year t divided 
by the stock of existing marriages in the state in year t, and similarly the new divorce rate, 
defines as the number of divorces in a state in year t divided by the stock of existing marriages in 
the state in year t.35  We lagged the percent married variable 10 years to get a measure of married 
households during childhood, and lagged the new married rate and new divorce rate 5 years 
assuming that children are already born and that most marriages fail within the first few years.36  
                                                 
35
 In order to compute these rates we interpolated the marriage stock for each state between census years.  Also we 
excluded Indiana and Louisiana from the analysis as they stopped reporting divorce data in the 1980s. 
36
 Almost half of all first marriages that end in divorce occur by year 5 compared to year 15, 20 percent by year 5 of 
the marriage versus a cumulative 43 percent by 15 years.  This is more true for younger wives, 29 percent versus 59 
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The results of including these regressors are contained in column 6 of Table 2.  All of these 
additional regressors have the expected sign.  The divorce rate is strongly positively related to 
future murders and is significant at the 5 percent level; marriage stock is negatively related to 
future murders and is significant at the 6 percent level, and new marriage rate is negatively 
related to future murders and is significant at the 11 percent level.  These variables reduce the 
estimated effect of illegitimacy and abortion by nearly the same amount, roughly 36 percent, 
however illegitimacy (abortion) remains significantly positively (negatively) related to future 
murders.37 
Finally, in column 7, we include a quadratic term in UFR in order to test in a simple way 
the implication of our model that the relationship between UFR and future crime should be 
convex.  Simply including a quadratic term may be inappropriate if the effects of the covariates 
on the crime rate differ over time, and later we will analyze the effects of UFR on crime across 
different periods to control for such problems.  Nevertheless, the results from column 7 strongly 
support a convex relationship between effective UFR and murder rates.  The implied minimum 
point from the quadratic occurs when the effective UFR is 77.61.  In other words, the first 7.76% 
of parents who choose not to marry seem to improve the welfare of their children for this choice, 
at least in terms of future criminality.  Additional unmarried fertility beyond this point, however, 
is crime-increasing.  Averaging across the states in our sample, national UFR first exceeds this 
minimum point in 1965 (see Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent for those married before 18; 24 percent versus 49 percent for those married at 18 or 19, and 17 percent 
versus 36 percent for those married between 20 and 24 inclusive (National Center for Health Statistics, 2001).  
Furthermore we assume that most marriages of unwed mothers would likely occur for younger aged children. 
37
 Ideally we would have used the share of households with two parents, children present, but unmarried as well as 
the share of households with two married parents, children present, and share of single headed households  in order 
to estimate the ameliorative effect of marriage.  If illegitimacy is fundamental, then greater shares of households like 
the former would still predict higher future crime, although perhaps less than those in single parent headed 
households.  Unfortunately the census combines the numbers of common law marriage households with married 
households and hence we are not able to better identify the effects of illegitimacy and marriage on future crime. 
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Another way of viewing our results is to ask, counterfactually, what the crime rate would 
be today if unmarried fertility had, instead of increasing, remained constant at the crime-
minimizing level (77.61) after 1965.  The 2002 murder rate was 5.64 murders per 100,000 
persons.  Our analysis suggests that, ceteris paribus, if UFR had remained at 77.61 since 1965, 
the murder rate in 2002 would have been between 5.26 per 100,000 murders, for a savings of 
1,094 murders in 2002.38   
Table 3 replicates the analysis in column 5 of Table 2 for each of the seven “index” 
crimes for which the FBI collects systematic state-level offense data.  It can be seen that 
unmarried fertility is associated with future crime for murder, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  
A similar relationship is also evident for robbery, although only at lower significance level.  
Unmarried fertility seems to be negatively correlated with rape and assault (although the effect 
on assault is statistically indistinguishable from zero).39 
One possible explanation for the inconsistent results for rape and assault is that these 
crimes are widely believed to be subject to serious underreporting, primarily because many are 
committed between romantic partners, family members, or other ostensible friends (Koss 1985).  
If, for example, women who were raised in fatherless households are less likely to report 
violence committed against them by their romantic partners, this could partially explain the 
apparent negative effect of unmarried fertility on reported rates of these crimes.40 
                                                 
38
 The effective UFR in 2002 is 133.07.  Using the coefficients in column 7, the difference in ln(homicide rate) 
between an effective UFR of 133.07 and one of 77.61 is:  
[(-0.0034*133.07) + (0.000022*133.072)] – [(-0.0034*77.61) + (0.000022*77.612)] = 0.07.   
Thus, the log crime rate would have been 0.07 points lower, and exp(Ln(5.64)-0.07) = 5.26. 
39
 Interestingly, while our results are broadly consistent with those of Sen (2003) and Hunt (2003), who examine the 
effects of teen births on crime, both authors find most of their effects through assault and relatively little through 
homicide. 
40
 Another possible explanation is based on the hierarchical nature of FBI uniform crime reporting (Levitt and Miles, 
2004).  If two crimes occur simultaneously in the same incident, such as a rape and a murder, only the more serious 
crime (homicide in this case) is reported.  Thus, the fact that unmarried fertility is associated with long run increases 
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In Table 4, we present several checks on the robustness of the measured effects in the 
previous two tables.  For readability, only the coefficient on effective UFR is presented, although 
the regression specification from which these coefficients are derived is the same as in Table 3, 
where all covariates are included.  Moreover, we also group burglary, larceny, and auto theft into 
a general “property crimes” category. 
The “baseline” row presents results from regressions identical to those in Table 3 (note 
the coefficient for murder is the same as in column 1 of Table 3).  To the extent one is concerned 
that effective UFR is highly correlated with current UFR, and thus in some complicated way 
might simply be a proxy for current social conditions in a state, inclusion of the 
contemporaneous value for UFR would ameliorate these concerns.  Row 2 shows that controlling 
for contemporaneous UFR does not have much effect on the relationship between effective UFR 
and crime.41 
Next, eliminating the population-based weighting scheme treats all states equally.  As 
seen in the third row, this moderately lowers the estimated effects of unmarried fertility, although 
it remains significant both for murder and property crime.  Changing our assumptions regarding 
the structure of the regression errors to ignore autocorrelation and cluster only at the state level 
does not seem to change the measured effects substantially either.  The inclusion of a state-
specific time trend soaks up almost all of the variation in the regressions; nevertheless, the 
estimated effect of unmarried fertility on murder is still statistically significant, although smaller 
in magnitude, and the effect on property crimes becomes of marginal statistical significance.  
Excluding Nevada and New Jersey, two states where a large proportion of the crime is 
                                                                                                                                                             
in murder, but not with long run changes in rape or assault, suggests that perhaps the effect of unmarried fertility is 
to cause rape and assault offenders to kill their victims. 
41
 The coefficient on contemporaneous UFR is insignificant.  Alternatively, a falsification test by which we simply 
replace effective UFR with the contemporaneous UFR reveals the same result: a small and insignificant coefficient 
on the contemporaneous UFR variable. 
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committed by visitors and tourists from other states, does not seem to affect the coefficients 
much.   
Excluding Washington, D.C., however, reduces substantially the estimated effect on 
murder, though with no apparent effect on property crimes.  Thus, almost half of the estimated 
effect of unmarried fertility on murder is driven by Washington, D.C.  It might be argued that, 
since D.C. is an outlier in the distribution of unmarried fertility in later years (see Figure 4), it 
should be excluded and the coefficient in Table 4 should be preferred to those in Tables 2 and 3.  
On the other hand, it might also be argued that such outliers are especially useful in 
understanding true effects since they provide substantial variation in the causal variable.  Even in 
the former case, however, unmarried fertility still appears to have an important and statistically 
significant effect on murder on the order of 2.7% for every 10 non-marital births per 1,000. 
Next, one may be concerned about how moments of the income distribution other than 
the mean might affect crime.  Controlling for the percentage of the state population in poverty 
does not change the coefficient for murder, although it lowers it somewhat for property crimes.42 
Controlling for racial population shares does not affect the results substantially either.  Finally, 
the inclusion of region-year fixed effects controls for any unmeasured factors that vary over time 
within census regions.  It does not appear that such effects bias our results. 
Region-year fixed effects may not fully control for omitted variables that vary over time 
and across states within those regions, however.  Since all of our previous analysis used the state-
year as the unit of observation, inclusion of state-year fixed effects is not possible.  Ideally, one 
could disaggregate the state-level crime data by some other variable, such as age, and then 
estimate the effects of unmarried fertility on crime by comparing crimes committed by different 
                                                 
42
 We do not include the poverty rate in regressions in Table 2 because it is not available at the state level before 
1969, except for the (t-1) census year, 1959.  Thus, this row in Table 4 uses fewer data points than those in Tables 2 
and 3. 
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age cohorts within a given state and year.  Unfortunately, crime incidence data is not so detailed.  
However, data on arrests by age within each state and year is available, although the relationship 
between arrests and crimes committed may not be one-to-one (see Levitt and Miles, 2004 for 
details on the problems associated with arrest data).43  Nevertheless, if our results differed 
strongly using data on arrests with state-year fixed effects, it might cast doubt on the results 
estimated above.   
Table 5 performs just such an analysis.  Coefficients are estimated for each crime from 
the following regression specification, based on DL and Foote and Goetz (2005): 
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where a indexes single years of age between 15 and 24, and s and t index states and years, 
respectively.  Note that fixed effects for state-year, state-age, and age-year are included.44  Since 
our data is now differentiated by age, the use of “effective” rates for unmarried fertility and 
abortion is unnecessary – we can simply use the UFR in that cohort’s birth year, and the abortion 
ratio in the year before that cohort’s birth year.45  Note further that, given the richness of the 
data, we can estimate the effects of unmarried fertility and abortion on crime separately for each 
single year of age; thus, the coefficients on these terms are subscripted by a.  Moreover, for 
                                                 
43
 Moreover, arrest data is not available for years before 1960, so we use only data from 1960-2002 in the analysis 
that follows. 
44
 Thus, we control for any variables that affect, e.g., everyone in Alabama in 1991, or all 22 year-olds in Texas over 
time, or all 18 year-olds across the country in 1995.  
45
 Technically, an individual of age a arrested in year t could have been born in three possible years: t-a-1, t-a, or t-
a+1 (and similarly, an aborted fetus in years t-a-2, t-a-1, or t-a could have been arrested in year t, had it been born).  
Therefore, following the suggestion in Donohue and Levitt (2006), we include once lag and one lead for each of the 
two variables specified in equation [3], and report the sum of the three coefficients in Table 5, and measure 
statistical significance by the joint significance of the three coefficients.  Excluding the leads and lags, however, 
does not change either the size or significance of the estimated results substantially. 
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readability, we also aggregate murder, rape, assault, and robbery into an omnibus “violent 
crimes” category, and burglary, larceny, and auto theft into “property crimes”.46 
 As can be seen in Table 5, unmarried fertility significantly increases future arrests for most 
ages in the murder and property crimes columns.  The results for violent arrests are not as strong, 
perhaps owing to the same factors that led to the surprising findings in our earlier rape and 
assault analyses.  For murder and property crimes, 18 out of 20 coefficients suggest that 
unmarried fertility leads to higher levels of future arrests, and 14 out of these 18 are statistically 
significant.47  The results for abortion are also generally consistent with our previous findings, 
with most estimated effects suggesting that abortion reduces future arrests.   
 Since the dependent variable has changed, the coefficients in this table are not strictly 
comparable to those in previous analyses; however, the sign and significance of the results 
suggests that state-level time-varying omitted variables are not causing significant spurious 
correlations in our analysis. 
 To summarize, based on our analysis of the 1957-2002 period, we find that unmarried 
fertility has robust long-run effects on crime, leading to an increase in murders and property 
crimes on the order of 2.5% – 5%, depending on the specification and data used. 
 
2. Social Stigma and Unmarried Fertility 
The theory presented in Section II implied that as social stigma against unmarried 
childbirth decreases, the estimated relationship between unmarried fertility and future crime 
                                                 
46
 In this analysis, our dependent variable is the count of arrests.  Population data by single year of age involves 
significant measurement error; thus, we do not use arrests per capita.  In unreported results, we find very similar 
effects on arrests per capita.  See Foote and Goetz (2005) and Donohue and Levitt (2006) for discussions of the use 
of arrests versus arrests per capita in such analyses. 
47
 There is only one case in which unmarried fertility seems to significantly reduce future arrests: for sixteen year-
old murder arrests.  Since there are very few sixteen year-olds arrested for murder, the number of cells with positive 
values in this category is quite small.  As the dependent variable is estimated with natural log, the estimates for the 
young ages in the murder category are thus based on very few observations, and so may be unreliable. 
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should become more positive, since the marginal child born to unmarried parents becomes more 
likely to have benefited from having married parents.  In this sub-section, we look for evidence 
of this theory in three places.  First, we consider how the effect of unmarried fertility on crime 
differs over time, since social opinions towards unwed mothers have changed substantially in the 
U.S during the last 50 years.  Second, we look at how the effect differs across racial groups, 
since stigma against unmarried fertility has generally been higher among whites than among 
nonwhites.  Finally, we look at how the effect differs across regions within the U.S., which vary 
in the severity of social norms. 
Table 6 considers the effect of unmarried fertility on crime as before by estimating 
coefficients from equation [2], but divides the sample into two time periods or epochs, 1957-
1984, and 1985-2002.  Before 1985, the hypothesized effect of legalized abortion on crime 
before 1985 cannot be important, as children born after national legalization in 1973 are only 11 
years old in 1984 and have not had much opportunity to commit crimes.  For this reason, the 
effective abortion rate is excluded in regressions over the 1957-1984 period.48 
The first two columns consider the effect of unmarried fertility on murder.  The results 
suggest that unmarried fertility is negatively correlated with future murder in the 1957-1984 
period, but positively correlated with murder in the 1985-2002 period.49  These results are 
consistent with the theory presented above, which implied that measured out-of-wedlock 
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 While there is some variation in the effective abortion ratio over this period, due largely to the few states that 
legalized abortion as early as 1969, inclusion of the variable does not change any results appreciably.  Furthermore, 
we estimated earlier that the crime-minimizing level of UFR occurred in 1965, implying that UFR should be 
positively associated with future crime for births after 1965.  Assuming a roughly median criminal age of 20, this 
implies that the positive relationship between effective UFR and crime should begin around 1985. 
49
 These results also show that the positive results in Tables 2-4 are not driven by selection effects from the few 
early years (1957-1966) when data for less than 32 states is available (see data appendix).  On the same note, further 
analysis (not presented) shows that the differences over time evident in Table 6 are robust to excluding all but the 20 
states for which data is available in every year. 
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childbirth should be less pernicious in early years when the social stigma against it was high, 
leading to only the lowest-quality parental matches not marrying. 
Again, it should be remembered that the epoch listed refers to the years of crime being 
explained; the effective UFR is a weighted sum of lagged unmarried fertility ratios, with the 
largest weights centered around 18-25 year lags.  Thus, the relevant variation in unmarried 
fertility driving the results in column 1 occurred primarily in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (the 
national UFR in 1950 was 41.23 per 1,000 births), while the relevant variation driving the results 
in column 2 occurred primarily in the 1960’s and 1970’s (the national UFR in 1970 was 108.59).  
Recalling Figure 1, a major increase in UFR began in the mid-1960s.  If declines in social stigma 
against unmarried fertility led to many marriages that would have benefited children being 
foregone, this may explain the fact that the effective UFR is positively associated with murder in 
the 1985-2002 period, and negatively associated with murder in the 1957-1984 period.  These 
results also imply that many marriages in the 1940s and 1950s were of such low match quality 
that the children involved would have been better off had their parents never married. 
Columns 3 and 4 perform a similar analysis for violent crimes generally.50  Again, we see 
that unmarried fertility seems to be negatively correlated with violent crime in the 1957-1984 
period, while there seems to be little or no effect on crime in the later period.51 
Finally, columns 5 and 6 perform the same analysis for property crimes.  Unmarried 
fertility seems to have little correlation with future property crime in the early epoch, but is 
strongly and positively related with property crime in the latter epoch. 
                                                 
50
 We argued before that biases in reporting for rape and assault may lead to biases in the estimated effect of 
unmarried fertility on these crimes; to the extent that this bias is constant over time, however, we can still use these 
data to test comparisons over time, and across races and geographic regions, as we do in this subsection. 
51
 The lack of apparent positive effect on violent crime in the latter period is, again, largely due to rape and assault. 
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In all three crimes, the measured effect of unmarried fertility on crime increases over 
time, consistent with the theory.  Since it might be argued that the 1985 cutoff year is arbitrary, 
Table 7 performs the same analysis as in Table 6 for murder rates, using a wide variety of 
periods of different lengths between 1957 and 2002 for analysis.  The row indicates the starting 
year, while the columns represent the ending year of the analysis, and each cell contains the 
estimated effect of the effective UFR on murder.  Estimates on abortion and other covariates are 
suppressed for readability.  Estimates close to the “diagonal” use fewer years of data, and so 
should be treated as less reliable.  In general, the clear impression from Table 5 is one of an 
increasing effect for later years in comparison with early years.52  Interestingly, there is an 
apparently positive effect visible in epochs dominated by data from the early 1960s (see the 1966 
and 1969 columns, e.g.).  This suggests that out-of-wedlock childbirth in the early 1940s was 
more pernicious for future crime than that in the late 1940s and 1950s, although this may be an 
artifact of the small sample sizes used to estimate these results.  Another, highly speculative, 
hypothesis is that this effect is due to the short-lived spike in unmarried fertility in the 1940s 
directly after World War II; these children may have been raised in particularly poor 
environments. 
An alternative explanation for these results is a change in the composition of unmarried 
fertility towards parents in lower socio-demographic strata.  However, if anything, the opposite 
seems to be the case – unmarried fertility has become less concentrated among teen mothers, less 
concentrated among nonwhites, and more children of unwed mothers are now living with both 
parents in a cohabitive home, as opposed to in single-parent homes (Ventura and Bachrach, 
2000).  All of these trends are, however, consistent with falling social stigma. 
                                                 
52
 Similar analyses of violent and property crimes evince essentially similar results, and so are omitted. 
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As a second test of the “social stigma” hypothesis, we decompose the effects of 
unmarried fertility on future crime by racial group.  Unwed mothers have long faced lower levels 
of social stigma among nonwhite groups than among whites (Graefe and Lichter, 2002, Cutright 
and Smith, 1988, Hogan and Kitagawa, 1985).  This may be part of the reason why unmarried 
fertility has generally been significantly higher among nonwhites: the averages over the 1923-
1990 span are 89.29 per 1,000 live births for whites, but 264.99 per 1,000 live births for 
nonwhites. 
Table 8 separates white and nonwhite out-of-wedlock births in their effects on crime.  
Problematically, some states, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, did not report racially-
disaggregated UFR data, leading to a reduction from the 1,409 observations previously employed 
over the 1957-2002 period to only 1,143 observations.  Many of the states that did report such 
data were concentrated in the South.  Thus, composition bias may cause these results to differ 
from the earlier analysis.  To check for this possibility, the first three columns of Table 8 
replicate the analysis from Table 3, using the total effective UFR for only the 1,143 observations 
for which racially-disaggregated data is available to analyze.  Comparisons between these three 
columns and those in Tables 2 and 3 suggest a high degree of similarity. 
The last three columns in Table 8 disaggregate the data by racial group.53  The results 
suggest that white nonmarital births are uncorrelated with future murder and violent crime, and 
negatively associated with future property crime.  On the other hand, nonwhite illegitimate births 
are positively correlated with all three crime categories.54  This is unsurprising in light of our 
                                                 
53
 However, the weights used in construction of the effective illegitimacy ratio are based on overall arrests, not 
racially-disaggregated arrests. 
54
 Since the total UFR is equal to a birth-weighted sum of the two racial UFRs, it is not the case that the two racial 
coefficients must sum to the total coefficient measured in columns 1-3.  For instance, an increase in the nonwhite 
UFR of 10 would only be associated with an increase in the total UFR of 10 multiplied by the percent of nonwhite 
births – thus, the coefficient on nonwhite UFR would be expected to be much smaller than that on total UFR.  
Therefore, to compare the coefficient in column 1 with that in column 4, one would need to multiply the coefficient 
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earlier findings that the effect of unmarried fertility on future crime changes sign depending on 
the level of unmarried fertility.  For instance, in Table 2, we estimated that the future crime-
minimizing level of UFR was 77.61.  The average across states in our sample exceeds this level 
in 1965, but non-white UFR exceeds this level in all years of our analysis, 1923-2002, while 
white UFR does not exceed this level until 1977.     
These results support the hypothesis that higher levels of social stigma against unmarried 
mothers are associated with a weaker relationship between unmarried fertility and future crime. 
As a final test of the theory, we exploit differences in social attitudes towards unmarried 
fertility across different regions of the U.S. during the early and mid-20th century.  Dividing the 
states into four census regions, we rank these regions by strictness in social mores according to 
two metrics: the prevalence of church membership and divorce rates.  Table 9 gives the results 
from a 1952 (the earliest available) survey of church membership, and 1938-1964 divorce rates 
per capita.55  By both metrics, one would expect the strictest social norms in the Northeast, 
followed by the Midwest, South, and West.56 
Table 10 presents estimates of the relationship between unmarried fertility and future 
crime for the years 1957-1984 (recalling that the most relevant birth cohorts for this era are 
roughly 1938-1964).  We expect regions with stricter social norms to have a more negative 
relationship between unmarried fertility and crime.  In fact, there seems to be some evidence that 
this is true for murder (see column 1), as the relationship is large and negative for the Northeast, 
                                                                                                                                                             
in column 1 by the non-white share of the relevant population.  If, for instance, the non-white share of the relevant 
population were 15% (roughly the non-white share of the total population in 2002), then column 1 would imply that 
an unit increase in non-white UFR would be expected to increase log crime by 0.09, which is roughly similar to the 
coefficient in column 4. 
55
 More useful, perhaps, than divorce rates per capita are divorce rates per stock of marriage.  Data on the stock of 
marriages is only available in decadal census years for this period; however, with interpolation between years, a 
rough measure of divorces per stock of marriage can be calculated.  The relative rankings of the four regions are 
unchanged, however. 
56
 In later years, the regions tend to converge, and cross-region mobility increases, making it more difficult to 
distinguish the regions.  Therefore, we focus on only relatively early years for testing the hypothesis. 
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small and negative for the Midwest and South, and large and positive for the West.  The same 
pattern holds for violent crimes, although we see little relevant spatial pattern for property 
crimes.57 
Therefore, the regional analysis is generally supportive of the hypothesis that social 
stigma influences the observed relationship between unmarried fertility and crime. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the relationship between unmarried fertility and crime over the period 
1957-2002.  First, we find that an increase of 10 nonmarital births per 1,000 live births is 
associated with an increase in future murder and property crime rates of between 2.5% and 5%.  
Next, we find that these effects have generally increased over time across all classes of crime, 
that white unmarried fertility seems to be less correlated with future crime than nonwhite 
unmarried fertility, and that states with stronger social norms see a smaller correlation between 
unmarried fertility and crime.  These effects we attribute to variation in the quality of the 
marginal parental match due to variations in social opprobrium towards unwed mothers.  When 
such stigma is high, the marginal marriage may actually be worse for the children involved than 
a single parent household, while the opposite is true when stigma is low. 
We also argue for the robustness of the results of Donohue and Levitt (2001) on the 
relationship between abortion and crime.  However, we find that the effect of abortion on crime 
is substantially dampened by the contrary effect of abortion on unmarried fertility, and that 
abortion is a blunt policy lever for affecting crime rates. 
                                                 
57
 Effective UFRs for murder by census region, 1957-1984, are 23.08 (Northeast), 21.21 (Midwest), 51.44 (South), 
and 15.00 (West).  Very similar patterns are observable for violent crime effective UFR and property crime effective 
UFR. 
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In general, it is important to understand the marginal benefits of various social policies in 
terms of crimes reduced, including policies that affect family structure.  Given the costs of 
improving family structure in various ways, optimal policies can then be structured.  Our hope is 
that this paper contributes to an understanding of the important role that family structure plays in 
affecting criminality.
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Data Appendix 
Abortion ratio 
Abortion data is from Centers for Disease Control, “Abortion Surveillance Report” 
[annual]. 
AFDC 
 Total payments divided by family receiving payments, from United States Statistical 
Abstract [annual]  
Arrests by Age 
From Federal Bureau of Investigation, produced and distributed by Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 
Beer Consumption 
Consumption of malt beverages from the Beer Institute’s Brewer’s Almanac [annual], in 
gallons consumed per capita. 
Church Membership 
Number of church members declared by 114 religious bodies in each state, divided by the 
total population.  Studies were performed in 1952, 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000 (e.g., 
Quinn, et al, 1982).  Data for other years is linearly interpolated. 
Crack Cocaine Index 
Crack index constructed by Fryer, et al (2005) as a weighted average of cocaine arrests, 
cocaine-related emergency room visits, cocaine-induced drug deaths, crack mentions in 
newspapers, and DEA drug arrests. 
Crime  
From Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States [annual]. 
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Enrollment Rates 
Percent of population aged 14-17, and 18-24, enrolled in high school and college, 
respectively.  See data appendix of Turner, et al (2007) for details. 
Executions 
Criminal executions by state from Espy and Smykla (2004). 
Low Human Capital Population 
Percent of state labor force members with fewer than 9 years of schooling, adjusted for 
migration, from Turner, et al (2007). 
Marriages and Divorces 
  Percent of ages 15+ population married from Census of Population and Housing, Vol II: 
Characteristics of the Population [decadal].  Counts of new marriages and divorces from 
United States Statistical Abstract [annual]. 
Percent Urban 
Percent of resident population living in metropolitan statistical areas, from Bureau of the 
Census United States Statistical Abstract [annual] 
Police  
  From Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States [annual]. 
Population by Age and Gender 
From Estimates for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States by 5 Year Age 
Groups and Sex: Annual Time Series Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau [annual]. 
Poverty 
Fraction of residents below poverty level, by state, from Bureau of the Census, United 
States Statistical Abstract [annual] 
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Prisoners 
Data on number of prisoners is from Correctional Populations in the United States, 
published annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Washington, D.C. ceased holding 
prisoners in 2001.  Data for 2003 in DC is linearly interpolated. 
Real output per worker 
Income per worker, from Bureau of Economic Analysis, converted to 2003 dollars with 
the consumer price index.  See data appendix of Turner, et al (2007) for details. 
Schooling, Average Years 
Average years of schooling among labor force participants.  See data appendix of Turner, 
et al (2007). 
Shall-Issue Concealed Handgun Law 
Dummy variable for whether the state had enacted a law requiring local law enforcement 
authorities to grant concealed weapons permits to anyone meeting certain pre-established 
criteria.  Data come from Lott and Mustard (1997). 
Unemployment 
Figures used represent the percent unemployed among civilian non-institutional 
population 16 years and older, with total unemployment estimates based on the Current 
Population Survey, taken from Bureau of the Census United States Statistical Abstract 
[annual].  Some early years of state-level data employ the “Handbook” method. 
Unmarried Fertility Ratio 
Births to unmarried mothers, as a fraction of 1,000 live births. 1925-1936: Data are from 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States [annual].  Some states 
supply race-specific UFR data, particularly Southern states, but others do not.  1937-
 41
2002: Data are from National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United 
States, Natality [annual],   NCHS collected the data from birth certificate records, using 
either a 50% or 100% sample in each state.  However, not all states ask about marital 
status on the birth certificate, and the number of states that do falls over the time period.  
With interpolation of fewer than 9 years in any particular state, UFRs lagged 8-34 years 
are available for calculating “effective” UFR for the following states starting in 1957: 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  In 
addition, effective UFRs are calculated beginning in years after 1957 for the following 
states: Alabama (1961), Florida (1958), Iowa (1958), Louisiana (1961), Missouri (1961), 
Nevada (1963), North Dakota (1958), South Dakota (1966), Tennessee (1961), Texas 
(1967), West Virginia (1959).  The missing early data for these states is generally due to 
the fact that they did not require birth certification until some year after 1923. 
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Figure 1: Unmarried Fertility Ratio: 1923-2002 
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Notes: The unmarried fertility ratio (UFR), 1923-2002, calculated as births to unmarried women 
per 1,000 live births.  Calculations are based on 32 states for which data on mother’s marital 
status is available with relatively little interpolation (see data appendix for details). 
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Figure 2: Predicted relationship between unmarried childbirth and future crime 
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Figure 3: States that Report Mothers’ Wedlock Status 
 
Notes: 32 states shaded in dark (including D.C.) are used for statistical analyses below, as these 
have reasonably consistent recording of unmarried fertility (see data appendix for details). 
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Figure 4: Effective UFR vs. Murder Rates, 1960 and 2000 
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Notes: 32 observations in each year represent states with available time-series data on unmarried 
fertility ratios (UFR), calculated as childbirths to unmarried women per 1,000 live births.  
“Effective” UFR is a weighted average of lagged UFR measurements intended to capture the 
extent of illegitimacy in the population of potential criminal offenders. 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 1957-1984 
Mean 
1957-1984 
St. dev. 
1985-2002 
Mean 
1985-2002 
St. dev. 
Murders per 100,000  7.58 4.30 7.63 4.53 
Violent Crimes per 100,000  335.63 219.42 586.42 261.85 
Property Crimes per 100,000 3302.78 1582.52 4500.68 1252.76 
Unmarried fertility rate  
per 1,000 live births 
125.70 63.49 293.62 65.78 
White unmarried fertility  
rate per 1,000 live births 
62.90 32.29 169.59 43.00 
Non-white unmarried fertility  
rate per 1,000 live births 
384.94 136.70 578.43 111.68 
Effective UFR per 1,000 live births 
(murder) 
32.95 20.35 98.35 39.52 
Effective UFR per 1,000 live births 
(violent crimes) 
39.61 23.58 93.31 34.11 
Effective UFR per 1,000 live births 
(property crimes) 
47.80 27.11 39.77 21.03 
Effective Abortion Ratio per 1,000 
live births (murder) 
--- --- 119.88 102.40 
Effective Abortion Ratio per 1,000 
live births (violent crimes) 
--- --- 107.28 82.58 
Effective Abortion Ratio per 1,000 
live births (property crimes) 
--- --- 149.84 98.83 
Prisoners per 1,000 1.08 0.53 3.15 1.67 
Police per 1,000 1.86 0.84 2.92 0.75 
Executions per 100,000 0.004 0.018 0.02 0.04 
Shall-issue concealed handgun law  
(1 = yes) 0.06 0.25 0.43 0.50 
Unemployment rate 6.09 2.46 5.66 1.60 
Real output per worker ($1997) 37,140.18 5,769.02 50,524.76 7,369.21 
AFDC payments per family 6,735.59 3,420.53 5,998.29 2,670.29 
Fraction population with  < 8 years 
schooling 
25.67 9.07 11.97 4.93 
Average years of schooling 11.02 0.84 12.89 0.55 
Secondary enrollment rate 91.09 8.24 90.45 4.80 
Higher education enrollment rate 32.15 8.27 51.94 8.24 
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Beer consumption per capita (gal.) 19.95 5.44 23.45 3.35 
Crack Cocaine Index  -0.00 0.13 1.62 1.05 
% Urban 68.88 12.80 73.07 12.34 
% Male 48.79 0.58 48.80 0.58 
% of population church members 28.11 9.75 24.62 10.36 
Racial Heterogeneity Index 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.11 
% 15+ population married 63.42 3.21 55.96 2.47 
New marriages per  
100 marriage stock 2.24 2.24 2.22 1.88 
Divorces per  
100 marriage stock 0.80 0.40 1.06 0.29 
Notes: Statistics based on 833 observations on 32 states between 1957 and 1984, and 576 
observations on 32 states between 1985 and 2002.  Out of a theoretical maximum of 896 
observations between 1957 and 1984, missing data limits the number of observations.  Data on 
prisoners, police, executions, and mental hospitalizations are lagged one year, and so correspond 
to 1956-1983 and 1984-2001.  Data on AFDC payments per family are lagged 15 years, and so 
correspond to 1942-1969 and 1970-1987.  “Effective” abortion and UFR are weighted averages 
of lagged vales of abortions and out-of-wedlock childbirths per 1,000 live births, respectively, 
with weights corresponding to the age distribution of the population of arrested criminals. 
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 Table 2: The Effects of Out-of-Wedlock Childbirth on Murder, 1957-2002 
 
 Dependent variable: Natural log murder rate per 100,000 population 
 
     
Effective UFR         
(x 100) 
0.14 
(1.97) 
0.30 
(4.44) 
 0.25 
(3.12) 
0.50 
(6.75) 
0.32 
(4.11) 
-0.34 
(2.49) 
Effective UFR2 
(x 10,000) 
      0.22 
(7.77) 
Effective Abortion 
Ratio (x 100) 
  -0.10 
(4.34) 
-0.07 
(2.52) 
-0.17 
(6.68) 
-0.11 
(3.75) 
-0.23 
(8.28) 
Ln(prisoners per 
capita) [t-1] 
 -0.05 
(1.57) 
-0.04 
(1.50) 
 -0.07 
(2.29) 
-0.07 
(2.27) 
-0.04 
(1.42) 
Ln(police per capita) 
[t-1] 
 -0.22 
(4.68) 
-0.25 
(5.60) 
 -0.24 
(5.41) 
-0.27 
(5.94) 
-0.27 
(6.02) 
Executions per 
100,000 persons [t-1] 
 -0.21 
(1.52) 
-0.27 
(1.89) 
 -0.18 
(1.34) 
-0.16 
(1.16) 
-0.17 
(1.31) 
Shall-issue concealed 
gun law (x 10) 
 -0.02 
(1.03) 
-0.05 
(2.55) 
 -0.03 
(1.52) 
-0.05 
(2.36) 
-0.07 
(3.08) 
Ln(real output per 
worker) [1997 $] 
 0.39 
(2.23) 
0.38 
(2.27) 
 0.52 
(2.87) 
0.76 
(3.99) 
0.53 
(3.00) 
Unemployment rate  -0.87 
(1.69) 
-0.89 
(1.78) 
 -0.89 
(1.80) 
-0.78 
(1.49) 
-0.94 
(1.95) 
AFDC payments per 
family (x 10,000)  
[t-15]    [1997 $] 
 -0.00 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.41) 
 -0.00 
(0.19) 
-0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.00 
(0.27) 
Average years of 
schooling 
 -0.20 
(3.75) 
-0.14 
(2.73) 
 -0.17 
(3.23) 
-0.21 
(3.82) 
-0.25 
(4.78) 
fraction with < 8 
years schooling 
 -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.56 
(1.85) 
 0.08 
(0.23) 
0.66 
(1.84) 
-1.03 
(2.90) 
Secondary  
enrollment rate 
 -0.90 
(4.91) 
-0.83 
(4.49) 
 -0.87 
(4.88) 
-0.86 
(4.83) 
-0.98 
(5.48) 
Higher education 
enrollment rate 
 0.06 
(0.27) 
-0.06 
(0.26) 
 -0.07 
(0.33) 
0.37 
(1.61) 
-0.15 
(0.73) 
Beer consumption per 
capita (gal.) (x 10) 
 0.00 
(0.94) 
0.00 
(0.75) 
 -0.00 
(1.04) 
-0.00 
(1.25) 
-0.01 
(1.86) 
Crack cocaine index  0.19 
(2.11) 
0.15 
(1.65) 
 0.22 
(2.44) 
0.17 
(1.78) 
0.21 
(2.25) 
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Fraction church 
members 
 -1.48 
(5.15) 
-1.20 
(4.47) 
 -1.58 
(5.60) 
-1.50 
(5.21) 
-1.20 
(4.38) 
Fraction urban  -1.08 
(2.76) 
-1.16 
(3.14) 
 -0.88 
(2.33) 
-1.13 
(3.02) 
-0.53 
(1.43) 
Fraction male  -15.94 
(2.61) 
-10.44 
(1.80) 
 -12.08 
(2.13) 
-
11.58 
(2.03) 
-7.48 
(1.34) 
Racial heterogeneity: 
1 – (%black)2 –  
(%non-black)2 
 1.59 
(2.61) 
1.79 
(2.80) 
 1.78 
(2.74) 
1.60 
(2.59) 
1.74 
(2.82) 
Population percent 
married [t-10] 
     -1.36 
(1.93) 
 
New marriages 
per marriage stock  
[t-5] 
     -1.83 
(1.62) 
 
Divorces per 
marriage stock [t-5] 
     16.45 
(2.27) 
 
Population 
Distribution (in 5-
year age groups) 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Obs. 1409 1409 1409 1409 1409 1321 1409 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions based on 1,409 observations for 32 states over the 
1957-2002 period, except column 6, which excludes Indiana and Louisiana observations (no 
divorce data is available for these states). Year and state fixed effects are included in all 
regressions, and observations are weighted by total state population.  Standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state 
autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach.  Variables measuring the fraction of 
a state’s population in each five-year age group from 0-4 through 70-74 are also included in the 
latter three columns. 
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Table 3: The Effects of Out-of-Wedlock 
Childbirth on Seven Index Crimes, 1957-2002 
 
 Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Auto 
Theft 
Effective UFR         
(x 100) 
0.50 
(6.75) 
-0.20 
(1.89) 
0.18 
(1.62) 
-0.12 
(1.00) 
0.35 
(4.87) 
0.49 
(7.07) 
0.28 
(2.66) 
Effective Abortion 
Ratio (x 100) 
-0.17 
(6.68) 
-0.17 
(5.17) 
-0.20 
(5.79) 
-0.19 
(4.96) 
-0.23 
(9.86) 
-0.23 
(11.18) 
-0.07 
(2.34) 
Ln(prisoners per 
capita) [t-1] 
-0.07 
(2.29) 
-0.03 
(1.17) 
-0.04 
(1.45) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
-0.07 
(3.64) 
-0.04 
(2.65) 
-0.04 
(1.67) 
Ln(police per capita) 
[t-1] 
-0.24 
(5.41) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.09 
(2.73) 
0.07 
(2.80) 
0.07 
(1.56) 
Executions per 
100,000 persons [t-1] 
-0.18 
(1.34) 
-0.19 
(1.85) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.14 
(1.44) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
-0.03 
(0.51) 
0.05 
(0.55) 
Shall-issue concealed 
gun law (x 10) 
-0.03 
(1.52) 
-0.02 
(0.99) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.11 
(0.76) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
0.34 
(1.75) 
Ln(real output per 
worker) [1997 $] 
0.52 
(2.87) 
0.20 
(1.47) 
1.10 
(6.48) 
-0.04 
(0.30) 
0.40 
(4.07) 
0.54 
(6.11) 
0.30 
(2.09) 
Unemployment rate -0.89 
(1.80) 
-0.39 
(0.95) 
0.47 
(0.91) 
-0.38 
(1.09) 
1.92 
(6.48) 
1.24 
(5.05) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
AFDC payments per 
family (x 10,000)  
[t-15]    [1997 $] 
-0.00 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(1.27) 
-0.03 
(2.51) 
-0.01 
(1.42) 
-0.01 
(1.47) 
-0.00 
(0.37) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
Average years of 
schooling 
-0.17 
(3.23) 
-0.03 
(0.59) 
0.05 
(0.67) 
-0.21 
(3.85) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
0.05 
(1.54) 
0.06 
(0.99) 
fraction with < 8 
years schooling 
0.08 
(0.23) 
1.06 
(3.06) 
1.21 
(2.67) 
-1.15 
(3.01) 
0.83 
(3.29) 
1.00 
(4.30) 
0.77 
(1.76) 
Secondary  
enrollment rate 
-0.87 
(4.88) 
-0.34 
(2.15) 
-0.12 
(0.62) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.06 
(0.54) 
0.16 
(1.57) 
-0.10 
(0.58) 
Higher education 
enrollment rate 
-0.07 
(0.33) 
-0.14 
(0.68) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
-0.08 
(0.42) 
-0.06 
(0.45) 
-0.24 
(2.01) 
-0.40 
(1.81) 
Beer consumption 
per capita (gal.)       
(x 10) 
-0.00 
(1.04) 
0.03 
(0.95) 
0.01 
(2.18) 
0.06 
(2.39) 
0.09 
(3.95) 
0.05 
(2.83) 
0.10 
(3.21) 
Crack cocaine index 0.22 
(2.44) 
-0.16 
(2.40) 
0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.14 
(2.39) 
-0.06 
(1.23) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.12 
(1.75) 
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Fraction church 
members 
-1.58 
(5.60) 
-0.75 
(2.87) 
-1.93 
(5.24) 
-0.43 
(1.44) 
-0.49 
(1.98) 
-0.68 
(3.17) 
-0.88 
(2.46) 
Fraction urban -0.88 
(2.33) 
0.59 
(1.68) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(2.03) 
-0.12 
(0.45) 
-0.31 
(1.27) 
-0.62 
(1.36) 
Fraction male -12.08 
(2.13) 
-15.71 
(2.94) 
1.65 
(0.22) 
5.62 
(1.00) 
-9.29 
(2.28) 
-7.77 
(2.21) 
9.29 
(1.49) 
Racial heterogeneity: 
1 – (%black)2 –  
(%non-black)2 
1.78 
(2.74) 
-0.31 
(0.90) 
-0.22 
(0.51) 
1.00 
(2.08) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.69) 
0.17 
(0.36) 
Population 
Distribution (in 5-
year age groups) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.99 0.97 0.83 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.92 
Obs. 1409 1356 1409 1409 1409 1409 1409 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions based on 1,409 observations for 32 states over the 
1957-2002 period, except for rape, for which some data is missing before 1960.  Year and state 
fixed effects are included in all regressions, and observations are weighted by total state 
population.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across 
states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten 
approach.  Variables measuring the fraction of a state’s population in each five-year age group 
from 0-4 through 70-74 are also included in the latter three columns. 
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Table 4: Robustness Checks 
 
 Murder Property 
Crimes 
Baseline 0.50 
(6.75) 
0.40 
(6.62) 
Include contemporaneous  
UFR control 
0.53 
(7.08) 
0.41 
(6.61) 
Unweighted regression 0.45 
(4.40) 
0.28 
(4.11) 
Assume no autocorrelation, 
cluster errors at state level 
0.47 
(3.55) 
0.41 
(2.59) 
Include a state-specific  
linear time trend 
0.39 
(2.52) 
0.20 
(1.68) 
Exclude Nevada  
and New Jersey 
0.50 
(6.49) 
0.35 
(5.53) 
Exclude D.C. 0.27 
(2.91) 
0.41 
(5.56) 
Include poverty  
rate control 
0.52 
(6.50) 
0.20 
(2.76) 
Include percent  
black control 
0.43 
(5.60) 
0.40 
(6.54) 
Include (region x year)  
fixed effects 
0.49 
(6.21) 
0.45 
(7.28) 
Notes: Each cell gives the coefficient on the “Effective UFR” 
variable in a regression of the form used in Table 3. 
Coefficients on other covariates are suppressed for 
readability. “Property Crimes” is an aggregate of burglary, 
larceny, and auto theft. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5: The Effects of Unmarried Fertility and Abortion on Criminal Arrests, by Age 
 
 ln(murder arrests) ln(violent arrests) ln(property arrests) 
    
UFR x (age = 15) -0.053 0.007 0.029 
UFR x (age = 16) -0.075** -0.003 0.025 
UFR x (age = 17) 0.064** 0.007** 0.033** 
UFR x (age = 18) 0.058 0.031 0.023 
UFR x (age = 19) 0.094** 0.028 0.043** 
UFR x (age = 20) 0.123** 0.025* 0.050** 
UFR x (age = 21) 0.149** 0.020 0.064** 
UFR x (age = 22) 0.231** 0.009 0.070** 
UFR x (age = 23) 0.241** 0.002** 0.079** 
UFR x (age = 24) 0.204** -0.009 0.061** 
    
F-statistic 2.52** 1.73** 2.40** 
 
   
Abortion rate x (age = 15) -0.026 -0.062** -0.040** 
Abortion rate x (age = 16) -0.060** -0.035** -0.015** 
Abortion rate x (age = 17) -0.050** -0.035** -0.014** 
Abortion rate x (age = 18) -0.043** -0.054** -0.026** 
Abortion rate x (age = 19) -0.043** -0.051** -0.026** 
Abortion rate x (age = 20) -0.036** -0.048** -0.019** 
Abortion rate x (age = 21) -0.010 -0.045** -0.015** 
Abortion rate x (age = 22) 0.039 -0.047** -0.016** 
Abortion rate x (age = 23) 0.021 -0.033** -0.016** 
Abortion rate x (age = 24) 0.035 -0.031** -0.028** 
    
F-statistic 2.61** 7.43** 4.09** 
    
R2 0.937 0.990 0.994 
Observations 15,842 20,136 20,851 
Notes: (**) indicates significance at the 5% level, while (*) indicates the 10% level.  
Regressions based on observations for single-years-of-age between 15 and 24 in each state over 
the years 1960-2002.  Year-state, state-age, and year-age fixed effects are included in all 
regressions.  Numbers of observations differ across crimes due to zeros and missing values in the 
data. 
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Table 6: Temporal Variation in Effect of Unmarried Fertility on Crime 
 
 Dependent variable: Natural log of specified crime rate 
 Murder Murder Violent 
Crimes 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
 1957-1984 1985-2002 1957-1984 1985-2002 1957-1984 1985-2002 
Effective UFR         
(x 100) 
-0.28 
(1.60) 
0.68 
(5.97) 
-0.51 
(2.50) 
0.14 
(1.09) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.61 
(7.58) 
Effective Abortion 
Ratio (x 100) 
--- -0.12 
(4.70) 
--- -0.17 
(5.64) 
--- -0.17 
(12.04) 
Ln(prisoners per 
capita) [t-1] 
0.05 
(1.27) 
-0.16 
(3.28) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.03 
(1.11) 
-0.05 
(2.18) 
-0.02 
(1.09) 
Ln(police per 
capita) [t-1] 
-0.15 
(2.98) 
-0.14 
(1.91) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(1.88) 
0.15 
(3.75) 
-0.07 
(1.95) 
Executions per 
100,000 persons  
[t-1] 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(1.08) 
-0.24 
(1.61) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(1.16) 
-0.05 
(0.69) 
Shall-issue 
concealed gun law 
(x 10) 
0.06 
(1.42) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.74) 
0.00 
(0.24) 
-0.03 
(2.00) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
Ln(real output per 
worker) [1997 $] 
0.29 
(1.21) 
0.77 
(2.95) 
0.45 
(2.76) 
0.54 
(2.89) 
0.50 
(5.17) 
0.32 
(2.64) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.74 
(1.15) 
-0.72 
(0.93) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.46) 
1.64 
(5.77) 
0.81 
(2.40) 
AFDC payments 
per family  
(x 10,000) [t-15]  
0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(2.44) 
-0.03 
(3.36) 
0.03 
(0.49) 
-0.00 
(0.82) 
0.09 
(2.46) 
Average years of 
schooling 
-0.09 
(1.24) 
-0.16 
(1.89) 
-0.29 
(3.86) 
-0.04 
(0.67) 
-0.15 
(3.43) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
fraction with < 8 
years schooling 
-0.62 
(1.29) 
0.53 
(0.87) 
-0.40 
(0.78) 
0.58 
(1.56) 
0.21 
(0.71) 
0.58 
(2.13) 
Secondary  
enrollment rate 
-0.69 
(3.28) 
-0.97 
(3.08) 
-0.22 
(1.28) 
0.43 
(2.03) 
0.07 
(0.68) 
-0.12 
(0.90) 
Higher education 
enrollment rate 
-0.55 
(2.17) 
0.27 
(0.68) 
-0.52 
(2.02) 
0.38 
(1.71) 
0.45 
(2.84) 
0.38 
(2.38) 
Beer consumption 
per capita (gal.)   
(x 10) 
-0.00 
(0.75) 
0.01 
(1.10) 
0.00 
(1.16) 
0.01 
(1.70) 
0.01 
(2.05) 
0.00 
(0.39) 
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Crack cocaine 
index 
-0.77 
(1.46) 
0.19 
(1.95) 
-0.28 
(1.07) 
-0.05 
(1.05) 
-0.14 
(0.88) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
Fraction church 
members 
-0.48 
(1.34) 
-0.36 
(0.49) 
-1.42 
(4.29) 
0.25 
(0.53) 
-0.30 
(1.58) 
-1.90 
(5.34) 
Fraction urban -1.56 
(2.66) 
0.83 
(1.34) 
1.66 
(2.72) 
1.42 
(3.27) 
-0.36 
(0.97) 
-0.10 
(0.37) 
Fraction male 8.27 
(1.18) 
-19.96 
(1.64) 
-4.40 
(0.46) 
1.56 
(0.23) 
-1.01 
(0.23) 
2.32 
(0.47) 
Racial 
heterogeneity:       
1 – (%black)2 –  
(%non-black)2 
  0.16 
(0.40) 
2.94 
(2.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
2.70 
(2.17) 
Population 
Distribution (in 5-
year age groups) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Obs. 833 576 833 576 833 576 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the time 
period listed in each column.  Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions, and 
observations are weighted by total state population.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state 
autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach. Variables measuring the fraction of a 
state’s population in each five-year age group from 0-4 through 70-74 are included in all 
regressions. 
 Table 7: Temporal Variation in Effect of Unmarried Fertility on Murder 
Row: Beginning Year; Column: Ending Year 
 
 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
1957 -0.36 1.93 2.07 1.04 0.59 -0.22 -0.30 -0.29 -0.31 -0.03 0.22 0.38 0.43 0.50 
1960  11.45 3.69 1.66 0.83 -0.23 -0.32 -0.29 -0.30 -0.02 0.23 0.38 0.43 0.51 
1963   -1.07 1.41 0.88 -0.36 -0.31 -0.22 -0.24 0.01 0.24 0.38 0.43 0.52 
1966    0.28 0.68 -0.76 -0.49 -0.24 -0.23 0.03 0.24 0.37 0.42 0.51 
1969     -0.34 -1.22 -0.69 -0.42 -0.30 0.03 0.26 0.38 0.44 0.53 
1972      0.01 -0.22 -0.07 0.03 0.27 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.64 
1975       -0.21 0.25 0.36 0.43 0.55 0.62 0.65 0.69 
1978        1.09 0.88 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.66 
1981         0.92 0.46 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.63 
1984          0.27 0.60 0.74 0.68 0.66 
1987           0.78 0.77 0.62 0.66 
1990            0.71 0.33 0.48 
1993             0.04 0.60 
1996              -0.12 
 
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at 95% level.  These are coefficients estimated on the relationship between effective UFR 
and murder, as illustrated in Table 2, for various time periods.  Coefficients on other variables are suppressed for readability.  The 
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“row” year is the beginning year and the “column” year is the ending year.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 
indicated time period.  Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions, and observations are weighted by total state 
population.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-
state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten approach. Variables measuring the fraction of a state’s population in each five-
year age group from 0-4 through 70-74 are included in all regressions. 
Table 8: Racially-Disaggregated Effect of Unmarried Fertility on Crime 
 
Dependent variable: Natural log of specified crime rate 
 Murder Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Murder Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Effective UFR         
(x 100) 
0.62 
(8.54) 
0.35 
(3.29) 
0.37 
(5.91) 
   
Effective UFR 
[white] (x 100) 
--- --- --- -0.05 
(0.27) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
-0.66 
(6.03) 
Effective UFR 
[nonwhite] (x 100) 
--- --- --- 0.08 
(1.95) 
0.14 
(2.65) 
0.07 
(2.14) 
Effective Abortion 
Ratio (x 100) 
-0.19 
(7.17) 
-0.25 
(9.22) 
-0.20 
(11.07) 
-0.09 
(3.49) 
-0.21 
(8.99) 
-0.14 
(7.55) 
Ln(prisoners per 
capita) [t-1] 
-0.09 
(3.06) 
-0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.04 
(2.39) 
-0.07 
(2.20) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
-0.02 
(1.59) 
Ln(police per capita) 
[t-1] 
-0.17 
(3.33) 
-0.04 
(1.01) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
-0.19 
(3.45) 
-0.03 
(0.96) 
-0.01 
(0.53) 
Executions per 
100,000 persons [t-1] 
-0.10 
(0.74) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.81) 
-0.23 
(1.62) 
-0.00 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
Shall-issue concealed 
gun law 
-0.04 
(2.21) 
0.00 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(1.62) 
-0.06 
(3.09) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
Ln(real output per 
worker) [1997 $] 
0.70 
(3.47) 
0.27 
(2.08) 
0.32 
(3.51) 
0.50 
(2.65) 
0.26 
(1.95) 
0.16 
(1.82) 
Unemployment rate -1.03 
(1.98) 
-0.29 
(0.87) 
1.03 
(4.15) 
-0.93 
(1.75) 
-0.28 
(0.82) 
0.93 
(3.77) 
AFDC payments per 
family (x 1000)  
[t-15]    [1997 $] 
-0.03 
(1.26) 
-0.02 
(2.43) 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(1.73) 
-0.02 
(2.55) 
-0.00 
(0.51) 
Average years of 
schooling 
-0.20 
(3.36) 
-0.10 
(2.08) 
0.10 
(3.00) 
-0.14 
(2.27) 
-0.07 
(1.38) 
0.06 
(1.82) 
fraction with < 8 
years schooling 
-0.18 
(0.50) 
-0.41 
(1.24) 
1.13 
(4.56) 
-0.49 
(1.20) 
-0.31 
(0.86) 
0.53 
(2.05) 
Secondary  
enrollment rate 
-0.81 
(4.48) 
0.07 
(0.57) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
-0.83 
(4.33) 
0.08 
(0.62) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
Higher education 
enrollment rate 
0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(1.42) 
-0.22 
(1.90) 
-0.04 
(0.16) 
-0.24 
(1.53) 
-0.19 
(1.65) 
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Beer consumption per 
capita 
0.01 
(1.17) 
0.01 
(2.87) 
0.01 
(3.13) 
0.02 
(3.57) 
0.01 
(3.31) 
0.01 
(3.07) 
Crack cocaine index 0.18 
(2.08) 
-0.08 
(1.78) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.13 
(1.50) 
-0.08 
(1.86) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
Fraction church 
members 
-1.85 
(4.04) 
-1.07 
(2.92) 
0.45 
(1.52) 
-1.48 
(3.89) 
-0.94 
(2.62) 
0.50 
(1.80) 
Fraction urban -0.70 
(1.69) 
-0.22 
(0.47) 
0.28 
(0.95) 
-1.07 
(2.57) 
-0.26 
(0.55) 
0.35 
(1.28) 
Fraction male -8.91 
(1.43) 
11.28 
(2.34) 
-3.63 
(0.98) 
-9.45 
(1.49) 
10.98 
(2.25) 
-2.27 
(0.61) 
Population 
Distribution (in 5-
year age groups) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 
Obs. 1143 1143 1143 1143 1143 1143 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 1957-
2002 time period.  Missing data limits the number of observations, however.  Year and state 
fixed effects are included in all regressions, and observations are weighted by total state 
population.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal correlation across 
states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data Prais-Winsten 
approach. Variables measuring the fraction of a state’s population in each five-year age group 
from 0-4 through 70-74 are included in all regressions. 
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Table 9: Church Membership and Divorce Rates, by Region 
 
 Church Membership 
(%), 1952 
Divorces per 1,000 
Population, 1938-1964 
Northeast 52.73  1.18 
Midwest 48.12 2.20 
South 42.54 3.08 
West 24.84 5.63 
 
Notes: “Northeast” region includes: ME, NJ, PA, RI. “Midwest” 
region includes: IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, SD, WI. “South” 
region includes: AL, DE, DC, FL, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, 
VA, WV.  “West” region includes: NV, OR, UT, WA, WY. 
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Table 10: Geographically-Disaggregated Effect of 
Unmarried Fertility on Crime 
 
         Dependent variable: Natural log of specified crime rate 
 Murder Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Effective UFR 
[Northeast]   (x 100) 
-1.42 
(2.48) 
-1.76 
(3.19) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
Effective UFR 
[Midwest] (x 100) 
-0.34 
(1.21) 
-1.23 
(4.10) 
-0.33 
(2.26) 
Effective UFR 
[South] (x 100) 
-0.23 
(1.30) 
-0.38 
(1.90) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
Effective UFR   
[West] (x 100) 
1.58 
(2.19) 
-0.39 
(0.72) 
-0.35 
(1.41) 
Ln(prisoners per 
capita) [t-1] 
0.04 
(1.04) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
-0.05 
(2.44) 
Ln(police per capita) 
[t-1] 
-0.11 
(2.25) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(3.53) 
Executions per 
100,000 persons [t-1] 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.28 
(1.86) 
0.10 
(0.92) 
Shall-issue concealed 
gun law 
0.06 
(1.37) 
0.03 
(0.80) 
-0.03 
(1.83) 
Ln(real output per 
worker) [1997 $] 
0.48 
(1.82) 
0.36 
(2.17) 
0.34 
(3.33) 
Unemployment rate -0.99 
(1.50) 
-0.29 
(0.64) 
1.65 
(5.72) 
AFDC payments per 
family (x 1000)  
[t-15]   [1997 $] 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.03 
(3.19) 
-0.00 
(0.73) 
Average years of 
schooling 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.29 
(3.72) 
-0.18 
(4.02) 
fraction with < 8 
years schooling 
-0.22 
(0.41) 
-0.80 
(1.47) 
-0.31 
(0.97) 
Secondary  
enrollment rate 
-0.58 
(2.81) 
-0.19 
(1.12) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
Higher education 
enrollment rate 
-0.46 
(1.81) 
-0.49 
(1.95) 
0.52 
(3.08) 
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Beer consumption per 
capita 
-0.00 
(0.99) 
0.00 
(0.68) 
0.00 
(1.85) 
Crack cocaine index -0.77 
(1.46) 
-0.29 
(1.07) 
-0.18 
(1.14) 
Fraction church 
members 
-0.62 
(1.60) 
-1.43 
(4.05) 
-0.19 
(1.08) 
Fraction urban -2.15 
(3.35) 
1.43 
(2.16) 
-0.09 
(0.23) 
Fraction male 10.99 
(1.52) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
-1.57 
(0.36) 
Population 
Distribution (in 5-
year age groups) 
YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.99 0.96 0.99 
Obs. 833 833 833 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions based on observations for 32 states over the 1957-
1984 time period.  Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions, and observations 
are weighted by total state population.  The “effective UFR” variable is interacted with four 
indicator variables, one for each census region on the U.S. to estimate the effect of unmarried 
fertility on crime by region.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, temporal 
correlation across states, and an AR(1) process for within-state autocorrelation using a panel-data 
Prais-Winsten approach. Variables measuring the fraction of a state’s population in each five-
year age group from 0-4 through 70-74 are included in all regressions. 
 
